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THE POST-CUNO LITIGATION
LANDSCAPE
Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smitht
I. CORPORATIONS & THEIR TkX-INCENTIVIZED COMMUNITIES

Most communities seem to want more corporations to call that
particular community "home." To that end, states have enacted
various sorts of tax incentive programs that reduce a particular tax
burden--often a property or an income tax burden-in exchange for
the corporation performing some economic activity in the state.'
Minnesota, for example, has such an incentive program. The program
is entitled Job Opportunity Building Zone, or "JOBZ." It provides
that businesses that locate in certain economically depressed
2
("challenged") areas of the state receive various tax incentives.

Tax incentive schemes like Minnesota's are not new, and there is a
sustained and vigorous debate about whether they work.3 Proponents
t Morgan L. Holcomb is a Visiting Assistant Professor and Nicholas A. Smith is a thirdyear student at the University of Minnesota Law School. The authors thank the staff and board
of the Case Western Reserve Law Review for excellent editing of this article. The authors also
thank the participants at the Case Western Reserve Law Review symposium for useful
comments on this article. Suzanne Thorpe, Associate Director for Faculty, Research, and
Instructional Services at the University of Minnesota Law School, provided quick and valuable
assistance in obtaining litigation documents.
I See Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State
Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) ("[Elvery state
provides tax and other economic incentives as an inducement to local industrial location and
expansion.").
2 See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.310-329 (West Supp. 2008).
3 See, e.g., Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic
War Among the States, THE REGION, Mar. 1995, at 3, 6, available at
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/arl994.cfm ("[When interstate competition] takes the form of
preferential treatment for specific businesses . . . it interferes with interstate commerce and
undermines the national economic union by misallocating resources and causing states to
provide too few public goods."); Pat Doyle, JOBZ ProgramHas Major Flaws, State Auditor
Finds, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB., Feb. 9, 2008, at Al, available at
http://www.startribune.com/politics/state/15440571.html (reporting that Minnesota's legislative
auditor claims that Minnesota's tax incentive program gives tax breaks to firms and
communities that don't need them, and that many businesses receiving tax incentives
would have expanded to the same or to a lesser degree without the tax breaks). For an
example of the conflicting popular views of tax incentives, see Mark Steil,
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hope that tax incentives will "attract new and expanding businesses,
create thousands of good jobs, contribute to robust economic health,
and restore a sense of hope for the future." 4 Critics, on the other hand,
argue that the incentives do not create jobs or spur economic growth,
and that the tax incentives end up costing more than the economic
activity they generate.5 Despite the debate, there is no indication that
states or localities are jumping off the tax-incentive treadmill: just
days after scholars gathered at Case Western Reserve law school for a
symposium to discuss these sorts of economic incentives, California's
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger announced that seven of eight
expiring California enterprise zones would be renewed for an
additional fifteen years (California has a total of forty-two enterprise
zones throughout the state).6
In addition to the debate about efficacy of the tax incentives, there
is an equally vigorous debate about whether the schemes are
constitutional. This debate came to the fore in 1996 when Professor
Peter Enrich of Northeastern University School of Law wrote in the
Harvard Law Review that state tax incentives are not
constitutional and set forth his thesis that the incentives, at least as
some of them are promulgated, violate the Commerce Clause.

Gubernatorial Candidates Face Farmers at Farmfest, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Aug. 2,
2006, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/08/02/farmfestgovforum/, in which
Minnesota's Governor Pawlenty called his JOBZ program "fantastic," while one gubernatorial
challenger called the program "a giveaway," arguing "it's a terrible mistake to think of JOBZ as
an economic development program." Another challenger claimed that the program simply
moved jobs from town to town as companies chose the no-tax incentive. Id.We should note
that Governor Pawlenty won reelection in 2006. See Minnesota Public Radio, Campaign 2006:
Election Results for Governor, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/2006/
campaign/results/governor.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2008).
4 JOBZ AND BUS. FIN. OFFICE, MINN. DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT AND ECON. DEV., JOBZ
2006 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2006), available at http://www.deed.state.mn.us/bizdev/PDFs/
JOBZ_2006 Annual Report.pdf.
5 See, e.g., DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, FREE LUNCH: How THE WEALTHIEST AMERICAN
ENRICH THEMSELVES AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE 89 (2007) (citing a study by Professor

Kenneth P. Thomas of the University of Missouri in St. Louis, "The Sources and Processes
of Tax and Subsidy Competition," which concluded that 1996 state tax incentives
amounted to $48.8 billion in foregone revenue, and resulted in $29.3 million that the states
collected in overall corporate tax revenue in 1996 (unpublished study, copy on file with
the authors, available at http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/crp274/swenson/CRP523/
Readings/thomaspaper.pdf)). See also Alan Peters & Peter Fisher, The Failures of Economic
Development Incentives, 70 J. AMER. PLANNING ASSOC. 27, 35 (2004) (concluding that business
incentives-including tax incentives-are not efficacious and that "there is a need for a radical
transformation of policy ideas on how we achieve local economic growth").
6 Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger made this announcement on Jan. 31, 2008. See Laura
Mahoney, California Governor Renews Seven Enterprise Zones, Designates New Zone in
Salinas Valley, BNA DAILY TAX REPORT, No. 23, at H1 (Feb. 5, 2008).
7 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States From Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV.L. REV. 377 (1996).
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Enrich's article garnered the attention of consumer activist Ralph
Nader, who contacted Enrich and encouraged him to litigate the
question.8
This article begins by describing the constitutional landscape into
which Enrich cast his argument. We then turn to the litigation that
Enrich's article has generated, including Enrich's own case, Cuno v.
DaimlerChrysler Corp., which held the promise of resolving this
dormant Commerce Clause question, only to wither away on the vine
of standing. Following our discussion of Cuno, this article will turn to
an exploration of the litigation that is currently proceeding in two
state courts: Minnesota and North Carolina. We conclude by offering
our perspective on the trends that appear from the state court
litigation.
II. THE RELEVANT FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause is the affirmative Constitutional grant of
power to Congress to regulate commerce. "The Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 9 This centralization of
power over commerce resulted from the framers' view of "destructive
trade wars among the states as a major problem under the Articles of
Taxation-and state tax competition-was
Confederation."'
instrumental in the inclusion of the Commerce Clause in the
Constitution. 1' State policies, including "[d]ifferent state taxation
policies," were of special concern to the framers because those

8 Professor Enrich discusses the genesis of the Cuno litigation on a Podcast from a
symposium at the University at Buffalo Law School. UB Law Conversations: Peter Enrich
on Economic Development Tax Incentives (University at Buffalo Law School Podcast Dec.
16, 2007), http://ublaw.classcaster.org/blog/facultyconversations/2007/12/16/peter enrich on
economic development tax incentives. For more discussion on the back story for the Cuno
litigation, see JOHNSTON, supranote 5, at 85-94.
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
l0 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 (15th ed.
2004).
11 See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era DiscriminationAgainst Interstate
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 49
(2005-2006) ("'[T]he centrifugal, contentious economic interests rising among the states' at the
time 'dampened ... postwar enthusiasm and reoriented public and private views towards the
Nationalists,' who warned that discrimination against the commerce of neighboring states
weakened the economies of all states .... " (first ellipsis in original) (quoting Cathy Matson,
The Revolution, the Constitution, and the New Nation, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA 363, 373 (Stanley L. Engerman &

Robert E. Gallman eds., 1996))).
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policies "weakened the economies of all states."' 12 Alexander
Hamilton asked, for example, "Would Connecticut and New Jersey
13
long submit to be taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit?"
James Madison shared similar concerns. He wrote "the desire of the
commercial states to collect . . . an indirect revenue from their
uncommercial neighbours, must appear not less impolitic than it is
unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as
well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign
trade.' 14 These taxation skirmishes, no doubt along with other
concerns, paved the way for the enactment of the Commerce Clause.
The Commerce Clause itself has played a primary role in
establishing our national economy.15 If Congress has not legislated in
an area of commerce, however, the Supreme Court may enforce the
anti-economic protectionism purpose behind the Commerce Clause
by striking down state discrimination against interstate commerce
through the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine ("DCCD"). As the
Supreme Court explains:
[T]he Constitution's express grant to Congress of the power
to regulate Commerce among the several States, contains a
further, negative command, known as the dormant Commerce
Clause, that creates an area of trade free from interference by
the States. This negative command prevents a State from
jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole by placing
burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders
that
16
commerce wholly within those borders would not bear.
In the realm of state taxation, the Supreme Court has developed a
four-part test-the Complete Auto test-to determine whether a state
tax violates the DCCD. 17 The Complete Auto test, from a 1977 case
with that same name, helps determine whether a challenged tax law is
unconstitutional. In particular, the test requires that any tax on
interstate commerce must satisfy four prongs:

12

Matson, supranote 11, at 377-78.

13 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton).
14 THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
15 See Matson, supra note 11, at 385 ("[The Commerce Clause] embodied a grant of

authority to Congress that created the conditions for the free movement of people, transport of
products and capital, and uniform institutions that, together, proved crucial to establishing a
national market.").
16 Am. Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005)
(internal quotations, alterations and citations omitted).
17 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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(1)Nexus: the tax must be applied to an activity that has a
substantial nexus with the state;
(2)Apportionment: the tax must be fairly apportioned to
activities carried on by the taxpayer in the state;
(3) Discrimination: the tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and
(4) Fairly related: the tax must be fairly related to services
provided by the state. 18
B. FederalStanding Doctrine
The DCCD was the driving constitutional force behind Enrich's
seminal 1996 article, but another Constitutional doctrine-that of
standing-proved to be just as important to Enrich's eventual case.
The farthest reaches of federal courts' jurisdiction are governed by
Article III's "case or controversy" requirement.' 9 The standing
doctrine has enabled the Supreme Court to flesh out the contours of
which plaintiffs may bring suit in federal courts and which cannot. In
doing so, the Court has been informed by constitutional and policy
considerations. Although considerations of judicial economy2 ° and
federalism 21 are implicated, the Supreme Court has expressed that the
separation of powers is the primary animating principle behind the
standing doctrines. 22 Separation of powers not only underlies the
concept of standing, but is also a useful interpretative tool in
conducting standing analysis.23
The Supreme Court has identified three "irreducible constitutional
minimum" elements of standing. 24 "First, the plaintiff must have
suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,
not conjectural or hypothetical. 2 5 In addition to "palpable economic
18Id. at 279.
19 See U.S. CONST. art III; See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
20 Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing
Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47, 48-49 (2006).
21 Id. at 49.

22 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (noting that the
separation of powers is the animating principle behind limiting judicial authority to cases and
controversies).
23 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 n.26 (1984) (rejecting the notion that the separation
of powers "merely underlie standing requirements," and stating that the Court also uses
separation of powers to interpret portions of the standing analysis).
24 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
25 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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injuries," which have always readily formed the basis for standing,
injuries to other types of interests, including "aesthetic and
26
environmental well-being," are also sufficient to establish standing.
Standing cannot be based, however, on a mere interest or abstract
concern in the outcome of a suit; only those parties with a direct,
personal stake in the litigation are granted standing.27
The second constitutional requirement-causation-requires a
party to show that the alleged injury is "fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct., 28 Where the injury
complained of may have been caused not by the defendant, but by
"the independent action of some third party" not joined in the action,
federal courts do not have the authority to adjudicate the dispute.29
Closely related to causation is the final constitutional requirement that
court action, if taken, will adequately redress the injury. As with
causation, redressability proves more difficult a barrier to overcome
when the injury complained of may be due to third parties not joined
as defendants.3 °
In addition to these three constitutional prerequisites, the Court has
also identified three "prudential" requirements to show standing. 3'
These prudential limitations on judicial power prohibit third-party
suits and generalized grievances, and require the plaintiff to show that
26 Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1972). Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky, in cataloging the types of interests that the Supreme Court has deemed worthy of
standing, has concluded: "The only conclusion is that in addition to injuries to common law,
constitutional, and statutory rights, a plaintiff has standing if he or she asserts an injury that the
Court deems sufficient for standing purposes." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 68 (1997).
27 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976) ("Our decisions make
clear that an organization's abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an
adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III."); United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973)
("Injury in fact reflects the statutory requirement that a person be adversely affected or
aggrieved, and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a
litigation-even though small-from a person with a mere interest in the problem." (internal
quotations omitted)).
28 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
29 Simon, 426 U.S. at 41-42. In Simon, indigent plaintiffs complained that a change in IRS
policy caused them to be denied medical care by area hospitals, which were not joined as
defendants. In denying the plaintiffs standing, Justice Powell noted that "[ilt is purely
speculative whether the denials of service specified in the complaint fairly can be traced to
petitioners' 'encouragement' or instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without
regard to the tax implications." Id. at 42-43. Without a more concrete showing of causation, the
majority opinion adhered to the established rule that "unadorned speculation" was insufficient to
merit judicial review of the complaint. Id. at 44.
30 Id. at 43 ("It is equally speculative whether the desired exercise of the court's remedial
powers in this suit would result in the availability to respondents of such services.").
31 These requirements are prudential because, rather than being viewed as compelled by
Article III, they are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Allen,
468 U.S. at 751.
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his or her injured interest falls within the "zone of interests"
contemplated by the statute. It is the ban on generalized grievances
that traditionally has proven most problematic for litigants seeking
standing based only on their status as taxpayers.3 2
C. Taxpayer Standing
33
In the seminal taxpayer standing case, Frothingham v. Mellon,
the Supreme Court dismissed a challenge to a congressional
expenditure where the plaintiff asserted standing based on her status
as taxpayer. 34 The Court explained:

[The federal taxpayer's] interest in the moneys of the
Treasury

.

.

.

is shared

with millions of others;

is

comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect
upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so
and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for
remote, fluctuating
35
[judicial review.]
This rationale implicates both constitutional and prudential
concerns. To avoid violating the principle of the separation of powers,
judicial review of congressional actions must be tied to some direct
injury. Because a taxpayer is only injured "in some indefinite way in
common with people generally," judicial review is inappropriate.36
The Court also expressed concern that granting the taxpayer standing
to challenge the congressional act at hand would open up the federal
courts to innumerable suits challenging every government
expenditure. The "inconveniences" of such a result led the Court to
state its almost categorical rule against federal taxpayer standing.3 7
32

Hickman, supra note 20, at 48.

33 262 U.S. 447 (1923). It is worth noting that the decision in Frothingham predated the

rise of modem standing jurisprudence. See Hickman, supra note 20, at 54.
34 The plaintiff alleged that because she paid federal taxes, the expenditure would
"increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take her property without due process of
law." Frothingham,262 U.S. at 486.
35Id. at 487.
36 Id. at 488. The Court clearly expressed its concern that taking cognizance of a suit
brought by a taxpayer solely because of her status as a taxpayer "would be not to decide a
judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another
and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess." Id. at 489. In the
Court's most recent treatment of federal taxpayer standing, it argued that taxpayers as such may
not even be able to make a sufficient showing of an injury-in-fact. See Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) ("In light of the size of the federal budget, it is
a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional federal expenditure causes an individual
federal taxpayer any measurable economic harm.").
37 Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487; see also Hein, 551 U.S. at 593 ("[l]f every federal
taxpayer could sue to challenge any Government expenditure, the federal courts would cease to
function as courts of law and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus.").
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The Warren Court expressly rejected the notion, however, that
federal taxpayers could never have standing to challenge government
action.38 In Flast v. Cohen, the Court outlined a two-part test to
establish when a federal taxpayer showed a sufficient personal
interest in the outcome of the suit such to warrant standing. "First, the
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status [as
taxpayer] and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . .
Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. 3 9 The
first part requires that the challenge be brought to a specific exercise
of Congress's taxing and spending power under Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution. 40 The second part requires that the plaintiff show a
violation of "specific constitutional limitations" on congressional
spending power, and not simply that Congress has exceeded its
authority generally. 4' Despite a recent opportunity to do so, the
42
Supreme Court has declined to do away with the Flast exception;
thus, it remains a narrow exception 43 to the otherwise general
prohibition on federal taxpayer standing.
The general prohibition against federal taxpayer standing is at odds
with the Court's liberality in granting taxpayers standing to challenge
municipal expenditures. 44 In Frothingham, the Court drew a
distinction between the "direct and immediate" interests of a
municipal taxpayer and the "minute and indeterminable" interests of a
federal taxpayer.45 The Court also justified the disparate treatment by
noting "the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the
corporation, which is not without some resemblance to that subsisting

38 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) ("[W]e find no absolute bar in Article III to
suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly unconstitutional federal taxing and spending
programs.").
39 Id. at 102.
4 Id.
41 Id. at 102-03.
42 Hein, 551 U.S. at 613-15 ("We do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it. We
leave Flast as we found it.").
43 Hickman, supra note 20, at 55-56 ("[W]hile the Flast Court recognized the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause as limiting Congress's taxing and spending power, in
almost forty years of subsequent jurisprudence, the Court has shown no inclination to recognize
any other constitutional provision as imposing like restraint, at least for purposes of taxpayer
standing. Moreover, in adopting a more lenient view of taxpayer standing in Establishment
Clause cases, the Court has not exempted such plaintiffs from the Article III standing
requirements of causation and redressability. The result is that very few federal taxpayer cases
survive a standing inquiry." (citation omitted)).
44 See, e.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (recognizing the
"frequently stated" rule that "resident taxpayers may sue to enjoin an illegal use of the moneys
of a municipal corporation").
45 Id. at 486-87.
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between stockholder and private corporation. 'A6 Whatever the
rationale, the "rule" recognized in dicta by the Frothingham Court
that municipal taxpayers have standing as such in federal court
remains good law.47 The question of state taxpayer standing is less
clear.
The Court extended its general prohibition against taxpayer
standing to challenges of state expenditures in Doremus v. Board of
Education.49 Without much elaboration, the Court stated that the
rationale supporting the general prohibition against federal taxpayer
suits was "equally true when a state Act is assailed., 50 The Court left
open the possibility for standing, however, when a state taxpayer
brings a "good-faith pocketbook action." 51 Just what constitutes a
good-faith pocketbook action remained open for interpretation by
lower courts.52
The Supreme Court took up the case of DaimlerChryslerCorp. v.
Cuno in 2006, perhaps in part to address the circuit split over whether
and to what extent state taxpayers could gain standing in federal
court. 53 The history of Cuno and the rationale behind its decision will

be detailed below. But lest we keep the reader in suspense, the
Supreme Court unequivocally held that "state taxpayers have no
standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions
simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers. 54 The Court also held
that taxpayers cannot leverage their municipal taxpayer standing in
order to have to their state claims adjudicated in federal court.55
ld.at 487.
41 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006) (citing, without
46

challenging, the municipal taxpayer standing rule first identified in Frothingham).But see Kyle
B. Gee, Note and Comment, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno-Denying State Taxpayers
Standing in Federal Court: Are Municipal Taxpayers Next?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1241, 1277
(2007) ("DaimlerChrysler'sincorporation of modem standing requirements in its decision to
deny Article III standing to state taxpayers may bring an end to Frothingham'srule of municipal
taxpayer standing. The DaimlerChryslerCourt concluded that the limitations on standing in
federal taxpayer suits should apply with undiminished force to state taxpayers. Arguably, these
same limitations prohibiting standing should also apply to municipal taxpayers." (internal
quotation and citation omitted)).
48 See Hickman, supranote 20, at 56-60.
49342 U.S. 429 (1952).
50 Id.at 434.
51 Id.

52For a brief discussion of the circuit split created by Frothingharn,Doremus, and Flast,
see Hickman, supra note 20, at 59-60. The Court addressed the issue of state taxpayer standing
again in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989), but only a four-justice plurality
concluded that "we have likened state taxpayers to federal taxpayers, and thus we have refused
to confer standing upon a state taxpayer absent a showing of 'direct injury,' pecuniary or
otherwise." Id. at 613-14 (citing Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434).
53547 U.S. 332 (2006).
54 Id.at 346.

55Id.at 349-52.
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To be sure, states are not required to adhere to either the
constitutional or the prudential doctrines that control standing in
federal court. State courts are free to abandon all of the federal rules
in favor of their own rules, even when adjudicating federal claims.56
We discuss later a few examples of states that have "chose[n] a
different path" 57 for taxpayers seeking standing in state court.
III. A MEETING OF THE DOCTRINES: THE CUNO CASE
The two doctrines described above, taxpayer standing and the
dormant Commerce Clause, played key roles in the Cuno case. The
seeds of the Cuno case were sown when Ohio created a two-part tax
incentive system to "encourage industrial investment and
58
development in Ohio, particularly in economically troubled areas.,
One part of the scheme allowed up to a 100 percent exemption of
property taxes owed on certain personal property if a business agreed
to increase economic activities in economically depressed areas.59
Specifically, the business had to "establish, expand, renovate, or
occupy a facility and hire new employees, or preserve employment
opportunities for existing employees., 60 Ohio also allowed an
investment tax credit against a business's state franchise tax liabilities
if the company bought new equipment and installed it in Ohio. The
business could claim up to a 13.5 percent credit if the equipment was
installed in an economically depressed area.6 ' Using this exemption
and credit scheme, Ohio offered DaimlerChrysler approximately $280
million in tax breaks in order to induce it to build a new vehicle
assembly plant near its Jeep plant in Toledo.6 2 DaimlerChrysler
expected to pour $1.2 billion into the project, and Ohio was eager to
gain the thousands of new jobs the plant would provide.63
Several taxpayers represented by Enrich challenged the two-part
system as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause. They originally
filed in Ohio state court, but the defendants removed the case to
federal court 64 Plaintiffs moved to remand the case, in part because
they doubted they would be able to establish standing in
federal court. The district court denied their motion because it
56

See ASARCO Inc., 490 U.S. at 617.

57Id.

58Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201 (N.D. Ohio 2001).
59See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5709.62(C)(1) & 5709.631 (West 2007).
- Id.§ 5709.62(C)(1).
61 See id.
§ 5733.33.
62 Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
63 Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004).
64 Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
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concluded the plaintiffs established at least the minimum standing
requirements for municipal taxpayers. 65 The district court adjudicated
the case on the merits, dismissing in turn all of the plaintiffs'
complaints.66
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that a business subject to Ohio
taxation could reduce its tax burden only by investing in Ohio;
investments made outside of Ohio would have no effect on its tax bill.
Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the investment tax credit coerced
businesses already in the state to "further invest[] in-state at the
expense of development in other states. 67 The defendants, on the
other hand, urged a more narrow reading of United States Supreme
Court precedent that would only invalidate tax incentive schemes that
' 68
"benefit local interests by burdening out-of-state commerce.
Because the Ohio credit was neither a protective tariff nor took into
account out of state activity when determining the credit amount, the
defendants argued that the credit scheme did not discriminate against
interstate commerce. The defendants also contended that the credit
was akin to a direct subsidy, which the Supreme Court has indicated
will ordinarily pass muster under the Commerce Clause.6 9
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court and held that the investment tax credit violated the Commerce
Clause. It specifically rejected the defendants' suggestion that only
two types of tax schemes violate the Clause, because "it is clear that
the [Supreme] Court itself has not adopted this approach., 70 The
distinction between burdening out of state commerce and benefiting
in state commerce was illusory: "economically speaking, the effect of
a tax benefit or burden is the same.",71 Thus, for purposes of the
Commerce Clause, it did not matter that Ohio reduced the tax burden
for in state activity rather than increase the tax burden for out of state
activity. The court of appeals also distinguished tax credits from
direct subsidies, which "do not ordinarily run afoul of the Commerce
Clause because they are not generally connected with the State's
regulation of interstate commerce., 72 Unfortunately, the court
provided little by way of analysis of the distinction. Although noting
that the "end-result economic impact" of both subsidies and
See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339 (2006).
Cuno, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
Cuno, 386 F.3d at 745.
68 Id
69 Id. at 746.
70 Id. at 745.
65
66
67

71 Id.
72 Id. at

746 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988))
(internal quotations and alterations omitted).
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investment credits is similar, the court determined rather abruptly that
the tax credit was constitutionally distinct from a subsidy, because it
involved "state regulation of interstate commerce through its power to
tax. 73
The property tax exemption, on the other hand, survived
Commerce Clause scrutiny. The plaintiffs argued that the conditions
placed on receiving the exemption had the practical effect of favoring
businesses that committed to maintaining certain employment and
investment levels in Ohio.74 Conditions on property tax exemptions
can violate the Commerce Clause if they require the taxpayer to
engage in another form of business or are only available "to
businesses with a specified economic presence. 75 The appellate
court, however, was convinced that the Ohio conditions were only
"minor collateral requirements . . . directly linked to the use of the
exempted personal property., 76 The court specifically distinguished
the investment tax credit, which reduces pre-existing franchise tax
liability, from the property tax exemption, which "merely allows a
taxpayer to avoid tax liability for new personal property., 77 The
practical effect of the investment tax credit, then, was to coerce
in-state investment by businesses that already had an economic
presence in Ohio; whereas, "any discriminatory treatment between a
company that invests in Ohio and one that invests out-of-state cannot
be attributed [to] the Ohio [property tax exemption] regime or its
failure to reduce current property taxes. 78
A. Cuno at the Supreme Court
The parties cross-appealed the Sixth Circuit's decision, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the investment tax credit
question. The Court also requested supplemental briefings on the
question of whether taxpayer plaintiffs had standing to bring suit.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the dormant
Commerce Clause question on its merits because of deficiencies it
found in the plaintiffs' standing.7 9
73 Id.

Id.
75 Id. (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 756-57 (1981)).
76 Id. at 747.
77 Id. at 747-48.
74

78

Id.

79 Professor Brannon Denning has argued that the Supreme Court's holding managed to

buy it time before having to decide the
context of state investment tax incentives,
unless the Supreme Court clarifies what
Clause Doctrine] is primarily concerned

harder issue of what "discrimination" means in the
but "[c]ases like Curio will continue to bedevil courts
it means when it says that the [dormant Commerce
with eliminating state laws that discriminate against
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Although the Court's decision was not surprising,8 ° the path the
majority took to deny the state taxpayers standing was explicitly
rooted in modem Article III requirements, rather than relying solely
on language from the Frothingham line of taxpayer standing cases.8
As a threshold matter, the Court questioned the plaintiffs' assumption
that the tax credit necessarily depleted the public treasury: "[t]he very
point of the tax benefits is to spur economic activity, which in turn
increases government revenues. 82 Even if the treasury was in fact
depleted, to show an injury-in-fact the plaintiffs would have to show
that the legislature would increase taxes to fill the void, an act on
which the plaintiffs could only speculate.8 3 The plaintiffs also had to
speculate about redressability, i.e., that the legislature would "pass
along the supposed increased revenue" resulting from invalidating the
tax credit to the taxpayers "in the form of tax reductions." 84 Finally,
even the contention that the tax credit caused the plaintiffs' alleged
injury required similar speculation about the future decisions of the
legislature.85 A complaint fraught 86
with this sort of speculation could
not "suffice[] to support standing."
The decision in Cuno also unanimously 87 settled the question of
whether state taxpayers were more like municipal or federal
taxpayers. The Court reaffirmed its reasoning in Doremus that state
taxpayers had to meet the same burdens for standing as federal
taxpayers; "[t]he ... rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing
applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers.' 88 The state
taxpayers' interest in the public treasury was equally "indeterminable,
remote, uncertain and indirect., 89 The state taxpayers had no more

out-of-state goods or out-of-state economic actors." Brannon P. Denning, DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, State Investment Incentives, and the Future of the Dormant Commerce Clause

Doctrine,in CATO SUP. CT. REV. 2005-2006, at 173, 174 (2006).
80 See generally Hickman, supra note 20, at 47-49.
81 See Gee, supra note 47, at 1260.
82 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 344 (2006).
83

Id. at 344-45.

84 Id. at 344.

85 Id. at 346. ("Federal courts may not assume a particular exercise of this state
fiscal discretion in establishing standing; a party seeking federal jurisdiction cannot rely on such
'[s]peculative inferences . . . to connect [his] injury to the challenged actions of [the
defendant.]' (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26,45 (1976))).
86 Id. at 344.
87 Justice Kennedy's opinion in ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612-17 (1989),
which explicitly suggested that state taxpayers, as such, are subject to the same almost
categorical ban from federal courts as are federal taxpayers, garnered support only from three
other justices.
88 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 345.
89 Id. (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952)).
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authority to force state lawmakers to pass along tax savings than did
federal taxpayers vis-6-vis federal lawmakers. 90 Moreover, "affording
state taxpayers standing" in federal court "would interpose the federal
courts as 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and
soundness' of state fiscal administration," 9 ' just as general federal
taxpayer standing would convert the Article III courts into "general
complaint bureaus. 9 2 The Court held that "state taxpayers have no
standing under Article III to challenge state tax
or spending decisions
93
taxpayers."
as
status
their
of
virtue
by
simply
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that their
Commerce Clause challenge was permitted under the exception
recognized in Flast. The plaintiffs argued that the Commerce Clause,
just like the Establishment Clause, served as a limit on the way that
states could spend public money.94 Although Flast left room for
taxpayer suits under other constitutional limits on Congress's Article
I, section 8 spending power, the Court was again unwilling to extend
the exception beyond Establishment Clause challenges. The Court
again rooted its decision in Flast in modem standing jurisprudence:
an Establishment Clause challenge is permissible because the
government expenditure is the very injury required for Article III
standing, and "an injunction against the spending would of course
redress [the] injury." 95 Challenges under the Commerce Clause, on
the other hand, require speculation about future legislative action to
establish injury and redressability.9 6 Allowing such actions would
simply open up the federal courts to hear a substantial number of
"generalized grievances. 97
Finally, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not leverage their
standing as municipal taxpayers to challenge a state tax incentive.98
90Id.at 345-46.
91Id. at 346 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760-61 (1984)) (internal quotation
omitted).
92Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007).
93Cuno, 547 U.S. at 346. The Court's opinion leaves open the question whether Doremus'
"good-faith pocketbook action" remains a valid exception to Cuno's plain rule against state
taxpayer standing. Any such action after Cuno will have to meet the requirements for Article III
standing. We predict that, unless the challenge is against a state expenditure allegedly at odds
with the establishment clause and therefore allowed by Flast, state taxpayers' suits will be
dismissed for lack of standing.
94Id.at 347-48.
95Id. at 348. The rights asserted by the plaintiffs under the Commerce Clause were
"fundamentally unlike the right to 'contribute three pence . . .for the support of any one
[religious] establishment."' Id.at 347-48 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968))
(internal quotation omitted).
96See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
97 Cuno, 547 U.S. at 348 (quoting Flast,392 U.S. at 106).
98 Id. at 349-53.
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The plaintiffs relied on two theories. First, they argued that because
municipalities received funds from the franchise tax collected by the
state, any credit given to DaimlerChrysler reduced the amount of
money available to the municipality. 99 The Court concluded this claim
was simply a complaint against the state dressed up as a municipal
claim, and it only served to "introduce yet another level of
conjecture" to the plaintiffs' speculative state claim.100
Equally unavailing was the plaintiffs' supplemental jurisdiction
theory-that once a federal court had jurisdiction over a municipal
taxpayer action, it could take cognizance over other taxpayer claims it
would not otherwise be able to adjudicate.' l0 The Court, however, had
never "permit[ted] a federal court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim that does not itself satisfy those elements of
the Article III inquiry,'' 0 2 including standing, mootness, ripeness, and
the limitation on hearing political questions. The separation of powers
dictated that
Article III remain a meaningful limit on the power of the
03
judiciary.

The unanimous Court 1' 4 concluded that none of the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge Ohio's investment tax credit. It thus vacated the
Sixth Circuit's decision and remanded to the lower court to dismiss
the taxpayers' challenge to the credit.
B. Status of the Cuno Litigation
One of the authors spoke briefly with Enrich in early
January 2008.105 Enrich reported that by the time the Supreme Court
finished with the case, and it was in a procedural position to return to
Ohio state court, the tax climate in Ohio had shifted drastically, and
the incentives were a year or so from being phased out completely.
Given the probable litigation strategy of the defendants, which was
predicted to be to delay until the incentives were gone and then move
for dismissal on the ground of mootness, the plaintiffs decided not to
go forward with the lawsuit.
99Id.at 349-50.
100Id.at 350.
101
Id.at 350-51.
1021d. at 351-52.
103Id.at

353.

Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, but would have arrived at it on the strength of
Frothingham,Doremus, and Flast alone, without relying on modem standing jurisprudence. Id.
at 354-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
105 Telephone Communication Between Peter Enrich and Morgan L. Holcomb (notes from
the conversation on file with the authors). This article addresses ongoing litigation, and relied in
part on telephone conversations with counsel. Notes of those conversations are on file with the
author and with Case Western Reserve Law Review.
104
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In the author's discussion with Enrich, and in his remarks at a
recent symposium at Buffalo Law School, he intimated that he will
continue to challenge state tax incentives in the appropriate case.
Enrich identified three key attributes in a putative plaintiff: (1) a good
target statute; (2) standing; and (3)-what he indicated as a critical
factor-the ability to put forth a grassroots organizing effort. Enrich
expressed regret, on the Buffalo podcast, that an opportunity for
public education and grassroots organization was missed in the Cuno
case. 106
IV. THE STATE COURT LITIGATION

We now turn to the status of litigation in two states: Minnesota and
North Carolina. In both states, two lawsuits have been filed, with one
case now concluded and one still in the early stages. We begin with
Minnesota.
A. Minnesota: The Land of 10, 000 Subsidies
As noted in the introduction, Minnesota's tax incentive program is
called "JOBZ"--the Jobs Opportunity Building Zone. The JOBZ
program was promulgated in 2003,1°7 and was considered a major
economic program of Minnesota's then-newly elected Republican
governor, Tim Pawlenty.10 8 JOBZ provides exemptions from
property, income, sales, and motor vehicle sales tax, as well as a
refundable jobs credit for certain businesses. 10 9 Rather than identify
which economically challenged geographic areas in the state qualified
for JOBZ treatment, the legislature delegated the responsibility of
identifying JOBZ zones to the Department of Employee and
Economic Development (Minnesota DEED).°10
161d; UB Law Conversations: Peter Enrich on Economic Development Tax Incentives,
supranote 8.
107 Olson v. State, 742 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
108See Doyle, supra note 3, at Al (noting that JOBZ is "[t]he state's leading program to
create rural jobs," and that Gov. Tim Pawlenty created the program); Charley Shaw, Gov.
Pawlenty's JOBZ ProgramChallenged,Again, ST. PAUL LEGAL LEDGER, July 7, 2007 (calling
the JOBZ program "Gov. Tim Pawlenty's signature rural economic development initiative").
The JOBZ portion of the Department of Employment and Economic Development website
variously refers to JOBZ as "key initiative" and "marquee rural economic development stimulus
program." Minn. Dep't of Employment and Econ. Dev., Job Opportunity Building Zones
(JOBZ): What is JOBZ?, http://www.deed.state.mn.us/bizdev/jobzwhat.htm (last visited May
22, 2008).
1
09MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.310-3201 (West 2008).
"Old. § 469.314 (providing that the "commissioner [of economic development], in
consultation with the commissioner of revenue, shall designate not more than ten job
opportunity building zones"); Id. § 469.310 (defining "Commissioner" as "the commissioner of
employment and economic development").
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In 2005, the first lawsuit challenging JOBZ was filed in Ramsey
County District Court. Plaintiffs in the first lawsuit included former
democratic Lieutenant Governor Alec Olson."' Olson filed as a
taxpayer and homeowner and claimed damages as a result of higher
property taxes and as a result of "being forced to bear a
disproportionate burden of supporting government functions of all
types."' 12 One of the plaintiffs' attorneys in the Olson lawsuit was
John P. James,
a former Commissioner of Revenue for the state of
13
1
Minnesota.
The Olson plaintiffs alleged that the JOBZ program suffered from
numerous state and federal constitutional infirmities. In particular,
plaintiffs claimed that JOBZ violated Minnesota's constitutional
requirement of uniformity in taxation; that the program
unconstitutionally surrendered and/or contracted away the power of
taxation; and that it violated the prohibition in the Minnesota
Constitution of granting local or special laws exempting property
from taxation, or granting special or exclusive privileges. The
plaintiffs also claimed the program violated the right to due process
(under both the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the
Minnesota Constitution). Finally, the plaintiffs raised an
"Enrich-style" dormant Commerce Clause argument: claiming that
the program discriminated against interstate commerce by using tax
exemptions and credits to induce businesses with Minnesota
14
operations to expand in Minnesota rather than in other states.
The state answered on the merits, but then moved for summary
15
judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing.'
The district court agreed with the state's interpretation of Minnesota
taxpayer standing jurisprudence, and dismissed the complaint.
The
6
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. 1
As the Minnesota Court of Appeals had the Olson case under
advisement, another case was filed challenging the JOBZ program.
17
This second case is captioned Interstate Motor Trucks, Inc. v. State."
Joining attorney James (the former Commissioner of Revenue) is
IIIComplaint at T 4, Olson v. State, No. 62-C8-05-002727 (2d Jud. Dist. Minn., dismissed
Oct. 17, 2006).
1121d. $43.
13Id.Plaintiffs are also represented by Stephen C. Rathke. Id.
1141d. 3.
115The state did not assert standing as a defense in their answer; rather, it was raised in a
summary judgment motion. See Joint Answer of Defendants, Olson, No. 62-C8-05-002727;
Respondents' Brief and Appendix, Olson v. State, 742 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
116
Olson, 742 N.W.2d 681.
17 No. 62-CV-07-845 (2d. Jud. Dist. Minn., filed Aug. 16, 2007). The case was filed in
Ramsey County District Court.
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attorney Robert Leighton. Leighton also has a political past-having
served four terms in the Minnesota House of Representatives, where
he was variously the Assistant Majority Leader and Assistant
Minority Leader.
In this second lawsuit the new plaintiffs, including several
companies that claim to compete directly with recipients of JOBZ
benefits, 1 8 raise many of the same claims raised by the Olson
plaintiffs. Specifically, the Interstate Motor Trucks plaintiffs raise
five claims of constitutional violation of the Minnesota
Constitution. 1 9 Notable for our purposes is what is not pled in the
Complaint-there is no Enrich-style claim of a dormant Commerce
Clause violation.
The state is not waiting for summary judgment this time, but has
raised the alleged lack of standing as an affirmative defense. 120 The
litigation is in its very early stages, 12 1 but the plaintiffs remain
guardedly optimistic on the standing issue. During a brief
conversation with one of the plaintiffs' attorneys, counsel indicated
they feel they have a strong case on standing, and that their litigation
strategy will result in a court finding that the plaintiffs have standing.
Similarly, shortly after the Interstate Motor Trucks case was filed,
attorney Leighton was quoted in a Minnesota Public Radio story as
having said "each of these plaintiffs feel they've been directly harmed
economically because of [the JOBZ program]. 12 2 The plaintiffs
include cabinetmakers, engineering, printing, telemarketing, and
trucking companies. 123
B. Taxpayer Standing in Minnesota Courts
As was made clear in the above discussion, federal taxpayer
standing jurisprudence has had something of a convoluted history. An
equally apt, perhaps even more apt, observation is seen in
Minnesota's taxpayer standing jurisprudence. To have standing in
118
Complaint at

1, InterstateMotor Trucks, Inc., No. 62-CV-07-845.
"91d. 2. The claims overlap with those of the Olson plaintiffs: an unconstitutional
surrender of the taxing power (through delegation and contract); a violation of Minnesota's
constitutional right to due process; a violation of the Minnesota constitutional provision against
local or special laws that exempt property from taxation or grant special or exclusive privileges
or immunities; and a violation of the Minnesota constitutional uniformity provision. Id.
120
Joint Answer of Defendants at
83-84, Interstate Motor Trucks, Inc., No. 62-CV-07845. 21
1 Tim Pugmire, Report: JOBZ Subsidy Program Unfocused and Lacking Oversight,
MINN. PUB.
RADIO,
Feb.
8, 2008,
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/
2008/02/08/jobz/ ("Leighton said the case is currently in the discovery phase.").
122
Tim Pugmire, Minnesota JOBZ ProgramFaces Another Lawsuit, MINN. PUB. RADIO,
June 27, 2007, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2007/06/27/jobz/.
123Id.
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Minnesota courts, a non-taxpayer plaintiff typically must have a
sufficiently personal stake in a justiciable controversy. 24 Minnesota
courts consistently have recognized, however, that in certain
circumstances, taxpayer standing deviates from both the typical
Minnesota standing requirements, as well as the federal standing
doctrine.125 In particular, at the very least, unlike plaintiffs invoking
"regular" Minnesota standing, plaintiffs invoking taxpayer standing
do not have to show a direct injury to maintain an action to enjoin
"unlawful disbursements of public moneys ... [or] illegal action on

the part of public officials,"' 126 because "expenditure of tax monies"
127
can suffice as a proxy for any "injury in fact" requirement.
In contrast, federal taxpayers, as discussed above, must show a
direct injury, unless they qualify for the narrow Flast-Establishment
Clause exception. That is, federal taxpayers can circumvent the
injury-in-fact requirement only in cases in which Congress has
utilized its taxing and spending powers in contravention of the
Establishment Clause. Since Minnesota taxpayers can circumvent the
injury-in-fact requirement by showing (apparently) any illegal
expenditure, Minnesota taxpayer standing is broader than federal
taxpayer standing. Indeed, the Minnesota courts explicitly have
recognized that Minnesota's standing requirements are less stringent
than federal requirements. 28 Despite this recognition, the Minnesota
courts have warned putative plaintiffs that there are limits to taxpayer
standing, and the Minnesota
Supreme Court has occasionally rejected
29
taxpayer standing.
Another notable distinction between standing in Minnesota state
court and federal standing is that Article III federal courts are
constitutionally limited to hear "cases and controversies." As
discussed above, although there are prudential standing norms,
standing in federal court is jurisdictional-if a federal court plaintiff
124State v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996) ("Standing is the
requirement that a party has a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a
court. ...Standing is acquired in two ways: either the plaintiff has suffered some 'injury-infact' or the plaintiff is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing."). As the
Philip Morris Court noted, standing can be conferred by statute. Id.at 495 ("The legislature
may, by statute, expand the connection between conduct and injury necessary to permit suit.").
125Olson v. State, 742 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) ("In contrast with standing
rules in federal courts, it is generally recognized that a Minnesota taxpayer has a broader basis
for standing than a litigant in federal court." (citing McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 570
(Minn.261977)).
1 McKee v. Litkins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 1977) (quoting Oehler v. City of St.
Paul, 219 N.W. 760, 763 (Minn. 1928)).
27
1 1d. at 570.
128
Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 684.

129See, e.g., St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 588
(Minn. 1977); State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn. 1946).
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cannot demonstrate standing, the federal court is powerless to act.
Minnesota state courts are not so strictly limited. 30 In Minnesota state
courts the "doctrine of standing is premised" not on a
constitutional command, but "on the preference
of courts that cases be
31
interest."'
personal
a
with
those
by
litigated
The Minnesota Court of Appeals refers to the exception to the
typical injury requirement as the "illegal expenditure" doctrine. 132 The
Olson court addressed the illegal expenditure doctrine, and ultimately
held that the illegal expenditure requirement was not met by the
Olson plaintiffs. In so holding, the Olson court intimated that the
illegal expenditure doctrine is the sole exception to the injury-in-fact
requirement for Minnesota taxpayers.
The Olson court began by observing that "[t]axpayers without a
personal or direct injury may still have standing but only to maintain
an action that restrains the 'unlawful disbursements of public
133
money . . . [or] illegal action on the part of public officials."
For this proposition, the Olson court cited McKee v. Likins, a 1977
case brought "principally as a taxpayers' suit" in which a plaintiff was
held to have taxpayer standing to challenge the use of state funds to
provide nontherapeutic abortions.1 34 The taxpayer had standing
because the "policy bulletin" permitting the payments had been
promulgated in violation of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure
Act. 35 In addition to McKee v. Likins, the Minnesota Court 1of
36
Appeals in Olson referenced other Minnesota Supreme Court cases,
130For example, Minnesota courts are permitted by statute to issue declaratory judgments.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 555.01 (West 2000). Minnesota appellate courts may issue advisory
opinions in the form of answers to certified questions. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.065 (West
2002 & Supp. 2008) (permitting supreme court to answer questions certified by federal courts
and appellate courts in other states); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 28.03 (permitting district courts to
certify criminal-law questions to a court of appeals). Finally, under special circumstances,
Minnesota courts are permitted to issue purely prospective rulings. State v. Baird, 654 N.W.2d
105, 110-11 (Minn. 2002) (outlining function and limits of special-circumstances rule).
131Metro. Sports Facilities Comm'n v. County of Hennepin, 451 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn.
1990). The Minnesota courts have, however, recognized some constitutional basis for their
jurisdiction. E.g., State ex rel. Sviggum v. Hanson, 732 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007)
(noting that the injury and redressability requirements are "rooted in constitutional text, the
nature ofjudicial decision-making, and prudential concerns").
132For example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that "[t]axpayers have a 'real and
definite interest in preventing an illegal expenditure of tax money' and have standing to
challenge projects likely to increase their overall tax burden." Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller
& Ciresi, L.L.P., 603 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Arens v. Vill. of Rogers,
61 N.W.2d 508,514 (Minn. 1953)).
33Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 684 (quoting McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn.
1977)) (emphasis added) (other alterations in original).
34
1 McKee, 261 N.W.2d at 568.
1351Id.

136 For example, the appellate court cited St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v.
Marzitelli, 258 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 1977). Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 685. In Marzitelli, the
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but relied primarily on Minnesota Court of Appeals cases for its
reasoning and its ultimate conclusion that, because the Olson
plaintiffs demonstrated
no illegal expenditure, the plaintiffs failed the
37
test for standing.
The Olson court's analysis begs at least two questions. First, the
type of expenditure that qualifies as an "illegal" expenditure is far
from clear. 138 Further, in addition to some clarification around what
qualifies as an illegal expenditure, the Olson case is not persuasive in
its suggestion that the illegal expenditure doctrine is the only way
Minnesota taxpayers can establish standing. At least the intermediate
court is not persuasive in its suggestion that the Minnesota Supreme
Court opinions must be read as foreclosing any other taxpayer
standing understanding.
There is no question that the illegal expenditure doctrine is one
strand of the Minnesota Supreme Court's taxpayer standing
jurisprudence, but the Minnesota Supreme Court has suggested that it
is not the only exception. For example, the state supreme court has
noted that "[olne recognized exception to this rule [against citizen
standing] is an action brought by a taxpayer to challenge an illegal
expenditure."'' 39 The express recognition that the illegal expenditure
doctrine is "one" recognized exception seems to presuppose other
recognized exceptions as well. There is no clear statement by the
Minnesota Supreme Court that the only taxpayer actions that satisfy
the standing requirement are those falling within the ill-defined
"illegal expenditure" exception. Indeed, the Olson court itself
discusses what appears to be another exception to taxpayer
standing-that enabling Minnesota taxpayers to "bring an action to
compel county officers to perform their public duties."' 140 Though the

plaintiffs actually sued to require expenditures-the plaintiffs complained about a state statute
that halted construction of a state highway, alleging that the failure to construct the highway
would result in a loss of federal matching funds. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the
taxpayer's standing argument in part because any money lost as a result of the state statute
would have originated from federal funds, not the illegal expenditure of funds. Marzitelli, 258
N.W.2d at 589.
137One intermediate case on which Olson relied, for example, was Rukavina v. Pawlenty,
684 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). The Olson court, quoting Rukavina, noted that
"'disagreement with policy or the exercise of discretion by those responsible for executing the
law' does not supply the 'unlawful disbursements' or 'illegal action' of public funds required
for [taxpayer] standing." Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 685 (quoting Rukavina, 684 N.W.2d at 531).
138Although the court conceded that generally "taxpayers have a real and definite interest
in challenging such illegal expenditures," the plaintiffs lacked standing because "there are no
such expenditures here." Id.
39Channel 10, Inc. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, St. Louis County, 215 N.W.2d 814, 820
(Minn. 1974) (emphasis added).
140Olson, 742 N.W.2d at 684 (citing State ex rel. Currie v. Weld, 40 N.W. 561, 562 (Minn.
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Minnesota Court of Appeals has reiterated its understanding of the
narrow taxpayer standing exception in other recent opinions, 141 that
sentiment is absent from Minnesota Supreme Court opinions.
To be fair to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has not given the intermediate court much to work
with. Taxpayer standing cases from the state's high court are few and
far between, and several taxpayer standing cases have had unique
procedural facts-such as a remarkable case in which the taxpayers
sued to establish the right to be taxed. 142 Other recent cases permit
taxpayer standing with absolutely no discussion of how such standing
is established.1 43 Despite the absence of clarifying recent precedent,
the court of appeals remains bound by Minnesota Supreme Court
precedent. It is far from clear that the court of appeals is being true to
that precedent.
The other question begging following the Olson case is the proper
scope of an "illegal expenditure." The Olson plaintiffs argued for a
broad construction of "illegal expenditure" when they suggested that
because state and local employees are paid with public funds when
those employees administer the program, the illegal expenditure
doctrine is satisfied. This broad understanding of "expenditure"
would provide almost limitless taxpayer standing. Such a broad
reading finds little support in Minnesota Supreme Court cases. In
contrast, the State argued for a construction of "illegal expenditure"
that seems hardly different from federal, or non-taxpayer, "injury in
fact" requirements. 144 That cannot be right either. The Minnesota

1888)).
141See, e.g., Olson, 742 N.W.2d 681; Rukavina, 684 N.W.2d 525.

142State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 25 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. 1946). The court held that,
while "relator renounces the benefits of exemption and seeks to be taxed," the "mere denial of a
desire to be taxed is not an act adverse or hostile to any legal interest of relator. No legal right
has been placed in jeopardy, and he is in no need of protection, unless it be from the
improvidence of his own desire. By exemption he has received a concrete benefit and not a
prejudicial burden." Id. at 477. The court illustrated the point with an analogy: "S vehemently
contends that he owes $1,000 to H, which H denies and which sum H refuses to accept or
collect. What bona fide legal interest or right of S has been jeopardized by the refusal of H to
assume the role of a creditor and accept payment of money not believed to be owing?" Id.
1"3E.g., Walker v. Zuehlke, 642 N.W.2d 745 (Minn. 2002) (holding that taxpayers,
including the local mayor, had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute
conferring tax benefits on communities within specified geographic area, while dismissing the
City of Cohasset for lack of standing--but providing no discussion of standing).
44See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-8,
Olson v. State, No. 62-C8-05-002727 (2d Jud. Dist. Minn., dismissed Oct. 17, 2006) (noting that
the Cuno case dealt with federal taxpayer standing, but nonetheless arguing that the rationale of
Cuno was applicable to deny the Olson plaintiffs standing).
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Supreme Court advises 14that
"injury in fact" is broadly construed in
5
cases.
standing
taxpayer
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not explicitly defined an
"illegal expenditure." Indeed, in an early taxpayer standing case the
court noted that its cases were "illustrative of the attitude which has
prevailed in this court concerning the interest of a taxpayer in the
illegal expenditure of his tax dollar."' 46 It has generally been up to the
appellate court and litigants to decipher that judicial attitude in
taxpayer standing cases. One example of that attitude can be found in
Phillips v. Brandt,147 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
a taxpayer had standing to challenge the allegedly illegal payment of
salary for a city position because taxes were a source of the funds
used. More recently, in a case involving a tax exemption for
professional sports teams, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a
government unit (the county) had standing to challenge the
48
constitutionality of exempting certain property from taxation.
Despite the supreme court's recognition of the "general rule ... that a
public official or governmental unit, in performing a ministerial duty
under a statute, may not question the constitutionality of that
statute,"' 149 the court permitted standing because the public interest
dictated judicial resolution of the dispute. 5 0
The Interstate Motor Truck plaintiffs might not have to wade
through this standing muddle. If the plaintiffs can show a direct,
personalized injury, they need not meet the "direct expenditures" test.
To that end, the Interstate Motor Trucks plaintiffs might be able to
use the state's own words to their advantage. In particular, in the
Olson summary judgment brief, the defendant state suggested that,
were the plaintiffs "competitors of any qualified business," the
plaintiffs would have standing under Minnesota Supreme Court
precedent. 15 1 It should come as no surprise that this second group of
plaintiffs is just that-competitors of qualified businesses. Since most
lawyers are "belts and suspenders" types, however, it would not be
surprising to see the plaintiffs attempting to demonstrate both
injury-in-fact standing as well as the type of expenditure that would

'45

In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Minn. 1992).

146Arens v. Vill. of Rogers, 61 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn. 1953).
14743

N.W.2d 285, 289 (Minn. 1950).
Sports Facilities Comm'n v. County of Hennepin, 451 N.W.2d 319 (Minn.

148Metro.

1990). 49

1d. at 321.
150 1d. at 322-23.
151Reply Memorandum in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 5, Olson v. State, No. 62-C8-05-002727 (2d Jud. Dist. Minn., dismissed Oct. 17, 2006).
1
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sanction taxpayer standing under the expenditure analysis set forth in
Olson.
C. North Carolina
Like its sister courts in Minnesota, North Carolina courts are also
dealing with litigation surrounding tax incentives. And like the
Minnesota intermediate court, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
has recently upheld the state's incentive schemes. In Blinson v.
State,152 a group of plaintiffs led by former North Carolina
Supreme Court justice Robert F. Orr and his North Carolina Institute
for Constitutional Law ("NCICL") launched a failed attack on the
"Dell incentives." The litigation involved tax incentives enacted for
"certain major computer manufacturing facilities."' 53 Although Dell
was not named in the enabling legislation or the legislative history,
there was no question but that the incentives were directed at Dell.
The legislation enhances "existing tax incentives and ... provide[s] a
tax credit for certain major computer manufacturing facilities."' 54 The
incentive package, which Dell negotiated with not only the state, but
also the City of Winston-Salem and Forsyth County, granted Dell
what is now estimated to run between $280 and $305 million in tax
55
breaks.
The Dell plaintiffs brought suit in Wake County District Court,
where the trial judge dismissed the complaint after finding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. 156 The plaintiffs appealed to the North
Carolina intermediate court and pursued five claims. Several claims
were premised on the North Carolina Constitution, including claims
that the Dell incentives violated the public purpose doctrine, the
exclusive emoluments clause, and the uniformity provisions of the
state constitution. Plaintiffs also asserted that the incentives were
unauthorized under the local development statute. Finally, plaintiffs
pursued their "Enrich-style" dormant Commerce Clause claim, and
152651

S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).

153Id. at 271 (describing the incentives); see also Act of Nov. 5, 2004, ch. 105, 2004 N.C.

Sess. Laws
204 (providing "Tax Incentives For Major Computer Manufacturing Facilities").
154
Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 271.
155Michael Hewlett,

Company Considers Building in Davidson, WINSTON-SALEM J.

(North Carolina), May 1, 2008, at BI, available at http://www2.joumalnow.com/content/
2008/may/01/company-considers-building-in-davidson ("In 2005, Davidson County offered
about $23.1 million to Dell Inc. for a $115 million plant. That plant was eventually built in
Forsyth County, and Dell received state and local incentives of up to $305 million."); States
Need Gumption to End Economic Incentives Game, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN-TIMES (North
Carolina), Dec. 6, 2007, at 4B ("In 2004, the state handed out $280 million in state and local
incentives to attract a Dell computer plant to Winston-Salem.").
156Blinson, 651 S.E. 2d at 273.
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asserted that the incentive package violated the dormant Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals first held that the plaintiffs
did in fact have standing to challenge plaintiffs' state constitutional
claims of violations of the public purpose and exclusive emoluments
clauses.1 57 But the plaintiffs victory was fleeting. Reasoning that it
was bound by a previous North Carolina Supreme Court decision, the
court went on to hold that plaintiffs' claim failed on
error correcting
15 8
the merits.
Although the Blinson court held that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge two of the state constitution-based claims, the court held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their remaining claims.
The court first addressed the claim that the incentives violated North
Carolina's uniformity of taxation constitutional provision. The court
observed that plaintiffs could not pursue the uniformity claim
did not belong to the class which is prejudiced
because the plaintiffs
1 59
by the statute.
In the same breath, the Blinson court bounced the plaintiffs'
federal dormant Commerce Clause claim. 160 The court reasoned that
"it is well-established under federal law that claims under the
Dormant Commerce Clause require plaintiffs to demonstrate that they
are prejudiced by the operation of the challenged statute in order to
establish standing.' 61 It is unclear how the court reached this last
conclusion. It could be that, under relevant North Carolina taxpayer
standing jurisprudence, the plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue
their federal claim. But the court cited the wrong law-federal
taxpayer standing jurisprudence will apply to federal taxpayers in
federal court. States are free to apply less rigorous taxpayer standing
the
rules to litigants in their own courts, regardless of whether
162
taxpayer asserts the claim pursuant to federal or state law.
Despite this initial set-back, the North Carolina plaintiffs are no
less tenacious than their Minnesota counterparts. Even before the
North Carolina court had a chance to rule on the Dell incentives, the
57Id. at 273-74 (citing Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 2006)).
158M. at 278-79 ("We hold ... under Maready [v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615
(N.C. 1996)] and Peacock [v. Shinn, 533 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), appeal dismissed,
546 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. 2000)] ...that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under the Public
Purpose Clauses of the North Carolina Constitution. . . . [T]he trial court did not err in
concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief under the Exclusive Emoluments
Clause.").
1591d. at 274.
Id.
160

161Id.(citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 286 (1997)).
162 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying discussion.
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NCICL had filed another lawsuit-this time challenging an incentive
package that went to Internet giant Google. 163 In this nascent lawsuit,
the plaintiffs make several of the same claims as were made in the
Dell lawsuit. 164 Absent from this second lawsuit, however, is the
dormant Commerce
Clause argument. The Google lawsuit is in its
65
early stages.'
V. SOME MODEST OBSERVATIONS

Two groups of plaintiffs in two separate states have challenged
similar tax incentive packages. Both groups initially faced what
turned out to be insurmountable taxpayer standing limits. Both groups
have reignited litigation in separate lawsuits. Both groups have also
abandoned the Enrich-style dormant Commerce Clause claims.
The appellate court cases in both states demonstrate the tricky
nature of taxpayer standing jurisprudence. Both state courts can fairly
be criticized for failing to provide well-reasoned guidance to future
litigants seeking to establish standing on the basis of taxpayer status.
At least one team of observers foresees little luck for the Google
plaintiffs. 66 In an article published in State Tax Notes, authors
affiliated with Tax Analysts 67 predicted that the Google plaintiffs
would face overwhelming procedural and substantive hurdles. North
Carolina case law that developed after the State Tax Notes article
proves that the analysts were off on their first prediction-the Google
plaintiffs will have standing, at least to pursue some of their claims.
But the Google plaintiffs still face the critical substantive hurdle of
163Complaint, and Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Munger v. State, No. 07 CVS
011756 (N.C. Sup. Ct. filed July 25, 2007). The Google suit was signed by counsel on July 25,
2007, and the Blinson decision was filed on October 16, 2007. See also Press Release, N.C. Inst.
for Constitutional Law, NCICL Files Lawsuit Challenging the Constitutionality of State
Economic Subsidies to Google, Inc. (July 25, 2007) (noting the filing) (on file with author).
164 See Complaint, and Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 163,
60-87.
165 1d. Bob Orr has launched a campaign for governor, and Orr's campaign website
discusses the folly of tax incentives. See Orr for Governor 2008, Economic Policy Overview,
http://www.orr2008.com/Issues/EcDev/EcDev.html (last visited May 24, 2008) ("Despite what
some politicians would like you to believe, the answer is not for state and county governments
to take your tax dollars and give them to a few giant global corporations, hoping for the
outsourcing of a small part of their operation to North Carolina, creating a few hundred jobs
with profits flowing out of state.").
166Jennifer Carr & Cara Griffith, Can North CarolinaConstitutionallySubsidize Google?
45 STATE TAX NoTES 585 (Aug. 27, 2007).
67
1 Tax Analysts describes itself as "a nonprofit publisher that provides the latest and most
in-depth tax information worldwide." About Tax Analysts, http://www.taxanalysts.com (follow
"About Tax Analysts" hyperlink) (last visited May 1, 2008). It describes its methods as
"working for the transparency of tax rules, fostering increased dialogue between taxing
authorities and taxpayers, and providing forums for education and debate" with the goal of
"encourag[ing] the creation of tax systems that are fairer, simpler, and more economically
efficient." Id.
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the Maready v. City of Winston-Salem 168 decision, in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld tax incentives. Absent a reversal of
the recent precedent, smart money is on the continued (state)
constitutionality of the North Carolina incentives.
Because the Minnesota Supreme Court has yet to address
Minnesota's incentive scheme, the outlook for the Minnesota
plaintiffs is less clear. It is clear, however, that the question of the
federal constitutionality of these types of incentives will have to await
another group of plaintiffs, since both the Minnesota and the North
Carolina plaintiffs have abandoned the federal dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine ("DCCD") challenges.
Given the dogged pursuit of the state constitution-based claims, we
wonder what precipitated the abandonment of the federal DCCD
claims. 169 Watching the Cuno plaintiffs make it all the way to the
United States Supreme Court only to be booted on the ground of
standing must be a sobering observation for any incentive-challenger.
Given that, it could be that plaintiffs' counsel has made a litigation
strategy decision to ditch the federal DCCD claims so that they are
guaranteed to stay in state court. By dropping the DCCD claims, the
plaintiffs will avoid the threat of removal, and the hassle and expense
of remand motions. It could also be that counsel has determined that
the DCCD claims will not be winners, as was suggested by Brannon
Denning when participating in the Case Western Reserve Law
Review symposium.
Taxpayer standing in Minnesota and North Carolina state courts is
less than clear. Why the state court plaintiffs abandoned their DCCD
claims is also a mystery. One thing we know with certainty, however,
is that absent an amended complaint17 ° in either the Google case or
the Interstate Motor Trucks case, the question of the Commerce
Clause constitutionality of state tax incentives will continue to be
academic.

168467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996).
169

We note that we have no special insight here. Although we talked briefly with counsel
for the Minnesota plaintiffs, we did not discuss the abandonment of the federal DCCD claims.
170
Once a responsive pleading has been filed, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
permit amended complaints "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party."
MINN. R. Civ. P. 15.01. Leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Id.
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure similarly permit amended complaints "once as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served .... Otherwise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires." N.C.R. Civ. P. 15(a).

